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RANK COMPLEXITY GAP FOR
LOVA´SZ-SCHRIJVER AND
SHERALI-ADAMS PROOF SYSTEMS
Stefan Dantchev and Barnaby Martin
Abstract. We prove a dichotomy theorem for the rank of propositional
contradictions, uniformly generated from first-order sentences, in both
the Lova´sz-Schrijver (LS) and Sherali-Adams (SA) refutation systems.
More precisely, we first show that the propositional translations of first-
order formulae that are universally false, i.e. fail in all finite and infinite
models, have LS proofs whose rank is constant, independent of the size of
the (finite) universe. In contrast to that, we prove that the propositional
formulae that fail in all finite models, but hold in some infinite structure,
require proofs whose SA rank grows polynomially with the size of the
universe.
Until now, this kind of so-called “complexity gap” theorem has been
known for tree-like Resolution and, in somehow restricted forms, for the
Resolution and Nullstellensatz systems. As far as we are aware, this
is the first time the Sherali-Adams lift-and-project method has been
considered as a propositional refutation system (since the conference
version of this paper, SA has been considered as a refutation system
in several further papers). An interesting feature of the SA system
is that it simulates LS, the Lova´sz-Schrijver refutation system without
semidefinite cuts, in a rank-preserving fashion.
Keywords. Propositional proof complexity, Lift-and-project methods,
Lova´sz-Schrijver proof system, Lower bounds, Complexity gap theorems
Subject classification. 68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem
complexity.
1. Introduction
It is a trivial observation that the question as to whether a given propositional
formula has a satisfying assignment can be reduced to a feasibility question
for a certain Integer Linear Program (ILP). Yet the easy reduction of a set of
clauses to a set of inequalities, when applied to propositional contradictions,
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gives rise to some very interesting propositional refutation systems based on
different methods for solving Integer Linear Programming.
By tradition, the two most important ILP-based refutation systems are
Cutting Planes, introduced as a general method for solving ILP in Gomory
(1958), and as a refutation system in Cook et al. (1987), and Lova´sz-Schrijver
(LS), introduced as a general method for solving ILP in Lova´sz & Schrijver
(1991), and first considered as a refutation system in Pudla´k (1999). A number
of mixtures of ILP-based refutation systems and algebraic refutation systems
are introduced and studied in Grigoriev et al. (2002).
Another method for solving ILP was proposed by Sherali and Adams in
Sherali & Adams (1990), but was not explored as a propositional refutation
system until the conference version of this paper, Dantchev (2007). Since then,
SA has been considered explicitly as a refutation system in Dantchev et al.
(2009). Furthermore, various results about integrality gaps have yielded lower
bounds for SA as a refutation system, e.g. those given in Schoenebeck (2008).
The SA relaxation is interesting in that it is a static and stronger version of
LS, the Lova´sz-Schrijver relaxation without semidefinite cuts. More precisely,
it is proved in Laurent (2003) that the rank k SA relaxation is tighter than
the rank k LS relaxation. The fact that SA is stronger than LS as a refutation
system follows from Rhodes (2008).
A number of lower bounds have been proven for ILP-based refutation sys-
tems. A non-comprehensive list of previous results relevant to our work include
the LS and LS+ rank lower bounds for a number of specific contradictions from
Buresh-Oppenheim et al. (2006) as well as the LS rank lower bound for the
Pigeonhole Principle from Grigoriev et al. (2002). No size lower bounds are
known for LS (other than for its tree-like restriction – see Beame et al. (2007)
and Pitassi & Segerlind (2009)), and it seems that the rank is the better com-
plexity measure for LS in the same way that the degree is a good complexity
measure for the algebraic refutation systems. More recently, and since the con-
ference version of this paper, attention has focussed on integrality gaps for SA
and its semidefinite variant, the Lasserre relaxation (see, for example, Charikar
et al. (2009); Georgiou et al. (2009); Mathieu & Sinclair (2009); Schoenebeck
(2008)). The Lasserre relaxations are tighter than each of LS, LS+ and SA.
Among a number of interesting results in Schoenebeck (2008), it is proved that
the Ω(n)th rank of Lasserre can not prove a random k-SAT formula unsatisfi-
able.
All results in Buresh-Oppenheim et al. (2006) and Grigoriev et al. (2002) are
lower bounds for specific contradictions. The aim of this paper is to prove a very
general LS rank lower bound that would apply to a large class of contradictions,
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namely those that can be expressed as FO sentences. Note that the Pigeonhole
principle as well as the Least number principle (stating that a finite order has
no minimal element) are such contradictions, which have been much studied
in the context of propositional proof complexity. Thus our motivation was to
obtain a result, similar in spirit to the so-called “complexity gap theorem” for
tree-like Resolution, explicitly stated and proved in Riis (2001):
Theorem 1.1. Given an FO sentence ψ which fails in all finite structures,
consider its translation into a propositional CNF contradiction Cψ,n where n is
the size of the finite universe. Then either 1 or 2 holds:
1. The sequence Cψ,n has polynomial-size in n tree-like Resolution refuta-
tion.
2. There exists a positive constant ε such that for every n, every tree-like
Resolution refutation of Cψ,n is of size at least 2εn.
Furthermore, 2 holds if and only if ψ has an infinite model.
Since Riis (2001), various complexity gap, or classification, theorems have ap-
peared: for a restricted class of contradictions for Resolution in Dantchev &
Riis (2003), for Nullstellensatz in Riis (2008), for Cutting Planes in Dantchev
& Martin (2009) and for a parameterised variant of tree-like Resolution in
Dantchev et al. (2007). In its strongest form, our result can be stated as fol-
lows.
Theorem 1.2. Given an FO sentence ψ which fails in all finite structures,
consider its translation into a propositional CNF contradiction Cψ,n where n is
the size of the finite universe. Then either 1 or 2 holds:
1. There exists a constant r such that Cψ,n has rank-r LS refutation for
every n.
2. There exists a positive constant ε such that for every n, every SA refu-
tation of Cψ,n is of rank Ω(nε).
Furthermore, 2 holds if and only if ψ has an infinite model.
In light of the rank-preserving simulation of LS by SA, this provides matching
gap theorems for LS and SA.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we define the two
refutation systems LS and SA, and explain the translation of an FO sentence
into a family of finite propositional contradictions. The main part of the paper,
Section 3, contains the proof of Theorem 1.2. It is divided into two – we first
prove the “easy”, constant LS rank, case in Section 3.1 and then move onto the
“hard” non-constant lower bound for the SA rank in Section 3.2. We finally
discuss some open questions.
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2. Preliminaries
The Lova´sz-Schrijver (LS) refutation system. Lova´sz-Schrijver is a lift-
and-project refutation system: it operates on linear inequalities over continuous
variables in [0, 1] by first “lifting” them into quadratic inequalities via multi-
plication by certain linear terms and then “projecting” these back into linear
inequalities by taking linear combinations in which the quadratic terms cancel
out. Formally, we introduce two continuous [0, 1] variables, pv and p¬v, for ev-
ery propositional variable v of the original CNF formula ϕ, with the intention
that pv = 1 if v = > and pv = 0 if v = ⊥. We introduce the equations
pv + p¬v − 1 = 0
for every propositional variable v as well as the inequalities
1 ≥ pv ≥ 0 and 1 ≥ p¬v ≥ 0.
We encode a clause
∨
j∈J lj of ϕ by the inequality∑
j∈J
plj − 1 ≥ 0.
There are three kinds of derivation rules.
1. Multiply a linear inequality by a variable pl, where l is a literal, in order
to get a quadratic inequality. If the original inequality contained a term
p¬l, the new quadratic term plp¬l vanishes, i.e. does not appear in the
result. If the original inequality contained a term pl, the new quadratic
term p2l reduces to pl.
2. Multiply any equation (either linear or quadratic) by a constant (real
number) or multiply any inequality by a positive constant.
3. Add any two inequalities.
An LS derivation of an inequality from a set of inequalities (often called axioms)
can be represented as a tree, whose leaves are labelled by axioms, and such that
every internal node is labelled by an inequality that can be derived in a single
step, using Rules 1, 2 or 3, from the inequalities that label the children of the
node. The root of the tree is labelled by the inequality that is finally derived.
The rank of an LS derivation is the maximal number of derivation steps, using
Rule 1, i.e. multiplications of a linear inequality by a variable, over all branches
(paths from the root to a leaf) of the derivation tree. The rank of an inequality
with respect to a set of axioms is the minimal rank over all possible derivations
of the inequality from the axioms. Finally, the LS rank of an unsatisfiable CNF
ϕ is the rank of the inequality −1 ≥ 0 with respect to the axioms.
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The Sherali-Adams (SA) refutation system. Sherali-Adams is a static
refutation system, so we shall define SA refutations of rank k, for every k, 0 ≤
k < n. More specifically, we shall encode a CNF formula ϕ over n propositional
variables as a linear program Lk - a system of linear equations and inequalities
over
∑k+1
d=0
(
n
d
)
2d continuous variables in the interval [0, 1].
We first introduce variables pC for every conjunct C =
∧
i∈I li of no more
than k + 1 variable-distinct literals li, |I| ≤ k + 1 (we shall write |C| ≤ k + 1
instead). Ideally, we would like to have pC = 1 if C = > and pC = 0 otherwise.
However, what we can express in linear programming is the inequalities
(2.1) 1 ≥ pC ≥ 0
as well as the equations
(2.2) pC∧v + pC∧¬v = pC
for every conjunct C with |C| ≤ k and every variable v. We also add the
obvious equation
(2.3) p∅ = 1
where ∅ is the empty conjunct (of size 0, i.e. ∅ = >). Note that these equations
do not depend on the initial CNF ϕ but only on the rank k. As for the clauses
(disjuncts) of ϕ, we encode any such clause D ≡ ∨j∈J lj by the following set of
linear inequalities
(2.4)
∑
j∈J
plj∧C ≥ pC
for every conjunct C with |C| ≤ k. It is important to note that when writing
indices of the form l ∧ C, the variable pl∧C vanishes whenever ¬l is present in
C (alternatively, one may keep such variables and see that they must evaluate
to zero due to (2.2)).
Finally, we say that the CNF ϕ has an SA refutation of rank k if k is the
smallest number for which the linear system Lk, consisting of equations (2.2),
(2.3) and inequalities (2.1), (2.4), is inconsistent. Thus, the system Lk itself
serves as a refutation of ϕ that can be verified in polynomial (in its size) time
by some polynomial-time linear programming algorithm. On the other hand,
in order to establish a rank lower bound k for an SA refutation, we need to
produce a valuation of the variables pC with |C| ≤ k+1 that satisfies the linear
system Lk.
It is not hard to see that SA simulates LS in a rank-preserving fashion.
The following proposition may be inferred from Laurent (2003), but we give its
(easy) proof for completeness.
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Proposition 2.5. An inequality that can be derived in LS rank k is conse-
quent of the inequalities of SA rank k.
Proof. By induction on the rank k. The case k = 0 (the axioms) is trivial.
Suppose that it is true for rank k. An inequality that can be derived in LS rank
k+1 is a positive linear combination of inequalities of the form
∑
j∈J αjpljpl ≥
βpl, for real numbers αj, β, where
∑
j∈J pljαj ≥ β is derivable in LS rank k.
But it is now clear, since
∑
j∈J pljαj ≥ β was consequent on SA rank k, that∑
j∈J αjplj∧l ≥ βpl (
∑
j∈J αjpljpl ≥ βpl) is consequent on SA rank k + 1. 
Translation of FO sentences into propositional CNF formulae. We
use the language of FO logic with equality but without function or constant
symbols, i.e. we only allow relation symbols. The omission of constants is purely
for technical simplicity (note that constants may be simulated by outermost
added existential quantifiers). We assume that the FO sentence is in prenex
normal form. The purely universal case is easy – a formula of the form
∀x1, x2, . . . xk F (x1, x2, . . . xk) ,
where F is quantifier-free, is translated into propositional CNF as follows. Let
us first consider F (x1, x2, . . . xk) as a propositional formula over propositional
variables of two different kinds: R-variables R
(
xi1 , xi2 , . . . xip
)
, where R is a p-
ary predicate symbol, and (xi = xj). We transform F into CNF and then take
the union of all such CNF formulae for x1, x2, . . . xk ranging over [n]
k (assuming
the finite universe is [n] = {1, 2, . . . n}). The variables of the form (xi = xj)
evaluate to either true or false, and we are left with R-variables only.
The general case – a formula of the form
∀x1∃y1 . . . ∀xk∃yk F (x, y)
can be reduced to the previous case by Skolemisation. We introduce Skolem
relations Si (x1, x2, . . . xi, yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, which give rise to S-variables.
Si (x1, x2, . . . xi, yi) witnesses yi for any given x1, x2, . . . xi, so we need to add
clauses stating that such a witness always exists, i.e.
(2.6)
n∨
yi=1
Si (x1, x2, . . . xi, yi)
for all (x1, x2, . . . xi) ∈ [n]i . The original formula can be transformed into the
following purely universal one
(2.7) ∀x, y
k∧
i=1
Si (x1, . . . xi, yi)→ F (x, y) .
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We shall call clause (2.6) a “big” (or Skolem) clause, and a clause that results
as in the translation of (2.7), a “small” clause, in order to emphasise the fact
that the former contain n literals while the latter contains constant number of
literals independent from n.
For a given FO sentence ψ, we denote its CNF propositional translation
obtained as explained above by Cψ,n where n is the size of the (finite) model.
We also consider the (infinite) case n = ω, which is an infinite (but count-
able) propositional CNF that has the same set of countable models as the FO
sentence ψ, except for the Skolem relations Si (x1, x2, . . . xi, yi) that are made
explicit in Cψ,ω. It is easy to see that Cψ,n is satisfiable iff ψ has a model of size
n.
Given a (propositional) variable of the form Ri (c1, c2, . . . cp) or Sj(c1, c2, . . .
cp, x), we call c1, c2, . . . cp arguments of Ri or Sj, respectively. We call x the
witness of Sj. We also call c1, c2, . . . cp and x the elements of Ri or Sj, re-
spectively. Two propositional formulae, built upon R-variables and S-variables
are isomorphic iff there is a bijection between the elements of the two that
induces a bijection between the variables that in turn induces an isomorphisms
between the formulae. Given a propositional formula ϕ, built upon R-variables
and S-variables, we call instances of ϕ all formulae that are isomorphic to ϕ.
3. Our result
3.1. First-order contradictions have constant rank Lova´sz-Schrijver
refutations. The FO sentences that have no models, either finite or infinite,
are universally false, so they have (finite) refutations in any sound and com-
plete refutation system for FO logic. We shall first introduce such a refutation
system, which is in fact FO Resolution but presented in a tableau-style man-
ner. We shall then show how to translate a refutation of an FO contradiction
ψ into a constant-rank LS refutation of Cψ,n (“constant” here and hereafter
means being independent from the size of the finite model n).
The refutation of ψ is a decision tree Tψ that tries to build a model of Cψ,ω
as follows. It starts with witnessing some unary Skolem relation in ψ with
the constant 1 and deriving further constants as Skolem witnesses of already
derived constants as and when necessary. (Note that we tend to discount the
empty model. It is, therefore, possible to have ψ with no finite models and
no outermost existential quantifier. In this case we may instantiate a single
constant at the outset to get us going.) Every internal node of Tψ makes one
of the following two kinds of queries:
1. A Boolean query of the form Ri (c1, c2, . . . cp) where Ri is a p-ary predicate
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symbol from ψ, and c1, c2, . . . cp are constants that have already been
witnessed along the path from the root of Tψ to the current node. The
tree then branches on the two possible answers, ⊥ and >.
2. A Skolem query of the form Sj (c1, c2, . . . cq, x) where Sj is a q-ary Skolem
relation witnessing a variable x for some already existing constants c1, c2,
. . . , cq. There are finitely many possible answers to such a query – x is
either one of the r constants witnessed along the path from the root to
the current node, {1, 2, . . . r}, or a new constant, which takes the next
available “name”, r + 1.
Every node u of the tree Tψ can naturally be labelled by the conjunction Cu of
all answers to the queries made along the path from the root to u. A branch
is closed, or equivalently its end-node v is a leaf of the tree, iff the conjunction
Cv contradicts one of the small clauses of Cψ,ω.
The order of variables in which the decision tree Tψ makes queries is as
follows. Given the set of constants U = {1, 2, . . . r}, known at a certain node
u of the tree, any R-variable (with arguments within U) comes before any S-
variable (with arguments within U). The order of Sj (c1, c2, . . . cq, x)-variables
is lexicographically-ascending on the tuples – in fact any order that eventually
lists every possible S-variable is adequate for our purpose.
In other words, when starting from u with the set of known constants U =
{1, 2, . . . r}, the decision tree Tψ first expands a subtree rooted at u that makes
all Boolean R-queries with arguments in U . Any leaf of the subtree then picks
the first S-variable that has not yet been queried, and branches on it. If the
answer was within U , the next S-variable is picked up and queried and so on;
if the answer was a new constant (whose name is now r + 1), the respective
node expands a subtree that queries all R-variables with at least one argument
set to r + 1. Any leaf of the subtree then picks the next unqueried S-variable
and so on. Of course, one has to bear in mind that a branch is closed, i.e. the
respective node becomes a leaf of the decision tree, as soon as the information
gathered by the queries along the branch is a direct contradiction to one of the
small clauses of Cψ,ω.
It is not hard to see that the procedure described above is a sound and
complete refutation system for FO logic.
Theorem 3.1. The decision tree Tψ is finite if and only if Cψ,ω is a proposi-
tional contradiction, which is equivalent to ψ being an FO contradiction.
Proof. Indeed, by expanding the decision tree Tψ, one attempts to create
all at most countable models of Cψ,ω, both finite and infinite. If the tree is
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finite, i.e. all branches have been closed, it follows that ψ has no models, i.e.
it is an FO contradiction.
It is not hard to see that an infinite branch is in fact an infinite model
as it never violates a small clause and eventually satisfies any big clause by
finding a witness for the infinite disjunction. Suppose now that ψ is an FO
contradiction (Cψ,ω is a propositional contradiction) but the tree Tψ is infinite.
As the branching factor of every internal node is finite, by Ko¨nig’s lemma,
there must be an infinite branch which constitutes an infinite model of ψ – a
contradiction. 
Example 3.2. We give an example of a decision tree Tψ constructed as in
the procedure just given. We consider the following sentence ψ which has no
models:
∀x∃y R(x, y) ∧ ∃x∀y ¬R(x, y).
As per our translation to propositional clauses, this is equivalent to the con-
junction of the universal clauses
(i.) ∀x∀y ¬S2(x, y) ∨R(x, y) and
(ii.) ∀x∀y ¬S1(x) ∨ ¬R(x, y),
together with the Skolem clauses
∀x∃y S2(x, y) and
∃x S1(x).
Figure 3.1 shows an FO decision tree for this system of clauses. The number
following each # specifies the clause that has been contradicted. For example,
the bottom right # comes from the knowledge S2(1, 2) and ¬R(1, 2) – which
contradicts the first universal clause. ♦
Before we explain how to turn a finite decision tree Tψ into a constant rank
LS refutation of Cψ,n, we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 3.3. The inequality
∑d
j=1 plj − 1 ≥ 0 has an LS derivation of rank at
most d from the inequalities
d∑
j=1
αjplj − β ≥ 0
plj + p¬lj − 1 = 0
plj , p¬lj ≥ 0
where αj > 0 for every j, and β > 0.
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?S1(x)
1

R(1, 1)?
>
yysss
sss
sss
s
⊥

#(ii.) ?S2(1, y)
1
yysss
sss
sss
s
2

#(i.) R(1, 2)?
>
yysss
sss
sss
s
⊥

#(ii.) #(i.)
Figure 3.1: Decision tree for Example 3.2.
The lemma follows trivially from the fact that the LS-rank of a valid in-
equality is bounded from above by the number of variables. We will however
give a concrete derivation for the sake of completeness.
Proof. We shall prove by induction on i that the inequality
(3.4) β
i∑
j=1
plj +
d∑
j=i+1
αjplj − β ≥ 0
has a rank i derivation. The basis case i = 0 is trivial. As for the inductive
step, we multiply the inequality (3.4) by p¬li+1 , and get
(3.5) β
i∑
j=1
pljp¬li+1 +
d∑
j=i+2
αjpljp¬li+1 − βp¬li+1 ≥ 0.
For every j 6= i+1, we add the equation pli+1+p¬li+1−1 = 0 multiplied by −plj
to the inequality pli+1 ≥ 0 multiplied by plj and we then multiply the result
by either −β if j ≤ i or by −αj if j ≥ i + 2 and add it to (3.5) in order to
transform any term of the form pljp¬li+1 into the term plj . We finally multiply
the equation pli+1+p¬li+1−1 = 0 by β and add it to the transformed inequality
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(3.5). The final result then is
(3.6) β
i+1∑
j=1
plj +
d∑
j=i+2
αjplj − β ≥ 0,
which completes the inductive step. In the end we multiply the final inequality
(3.5) for i = d by 1
β
in order to get the desired result
∑d
j=1 plj − 1 ≥ 0.
Each inductive step increased the rank by at most 1, so the total rank of the
derivation is at most d as claimed. 
We are now ready to state and prove our main lemma in the “easy” case.
Lemma 3.7. Whenever a node u in the tree Tψ is labelled by a conjunction
∧dj=1lj, there is an LS derivation of the inequality
∑d
j=1 p¬lj − 1 ≥ 0 of rank at
most huh where h is the height of Tψ and hu is the height of the subtree rooted
at u.
Proof. We shall proceed by induction on hu.
The basis case hu = 0 is easy: u is a leaf of the tree, so it is labelled by a
direct contradiction to a small clause. More formally, the information gathered
along the path from the root to u is a conjunction of the form
∧
i∈C ¬li∧
∧
j∈D lj
where the disjunction
∨
i∈C li is a small clause from Cψ,n. Recall now that the LS
encoding of that clause is
∑
i∈C pli−1 ≥ 0, which when added to the LS axioms
p¬lj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ D gives the desired result
∑
i∈C pli +
∑
j∈D p¬lj − 1 ≥ 0,
and note that this derivation is of rank 0.
As for the inductive step in case hu > 0, we need to consider the type of
query, which the internal node u makes. Let us first denote the conjunction
label of u by
∧
i∈C li, where each li is a literal built upon either an R-variable
or an S-variable.
1. The query at u is a Boolean one, i.e. of the form Ri (c1, c2, . . . cp) (we
shorten this notation to Ri (c¯)). The two successors of u are then la-
belled by
∧
i∈C li∧Ri (c¯) and
∧
i∈C li∧¬Ri (c¯), respectively which, by the
inductive hypothesis, implies that both∑
i∈C
p¬li + p¬Ri(c¯) − 1 ≥ 0
and ∑
i∈C
p¬li + pRi(c¯) − 1 ≥ 0,
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have LS derivations of rank at most h (hu − 1). Adding these two plus
the LS axiom pRi(c¯) + p¬Ri(c¯) − 1 = 0 multiplied by −1 yields
2
∑
i∈C
p¬li − 1 ≥ 0.
An application of Lemma 3.3 with αi = 2, β = 1, and d = |C| ≤ h gives
the desired inequality with an LS derivation of rank at most h.
2. The query at u is a Skolem one, i.e. of the form Sj (c1, c2, . . . cq, x) (we
shorten this to Sj (c¯, x)). Denoting the set of constants, known at the
node u, by U = {1, 2, . . . r}, there are r + 1 successors of u in the tree.
We shall consider two sub-cases:
(a) x is a constant already known, i.e. x ∈ U . By the inductive hypoth-
esis the inequalities∑
i∈C
p¬li + p¬Sj(c¯,x) − 1 ≥ 0 for x ∈ U
have LS derivations of rank at most h (hu − 1).
(b) x is a new constant, i.e. x = r+1. As the set of known constants U is
contiguous at any node of the decision tree, i.e. x /∈ U is equivalent
to x /∈ Elms (∧i∈C li), i.e. by the inductive hypothesis, we can derive
all instances of
∧
i∈C li ∧ Sj (c¯, x) where x /∈ Elms
(∧
i∈C li
)
. (Here
Elms (C) denotes the set of all elements mentioned by the conjunct
C.) Thus we can derive in LS the inequalities∑
i∈C
p¬li + p¬Sj(c¯,x) − 1 ≥ 0 for x /∈ U
by derivations of rank at most h (hu − 1).
Adding together the inequalities obtained in the two cases yield
n
∑
i∈C
p¬li +
∑
x∈[n]
p¬Sj(c¯,x) − n ≥ 0.
We now add the inequality above to the big clause
∑
x∈[n] pSj(c¯,x)− 1 ≥ 0
together with the LS axioms pSj(c¯,x) + p¬Sj(c¯,x) − 1 = 0 multiplied by −1
for every x ∈ [n] in order to get
n
∑
i∈C
p¬li − 1 ≥ 0.
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Finally, an application of Lemma 3.3 with αi = n, β = 1, and d = |C| ≤ h
gives the desired inequality with an LS derivation of rank at most h.

In the end, we can derive and state the main theorem as an easy consequence
of Lemma 3.7. Indeed, applying the lemma to the root of the decision tree Tψ,
we realise that there is an LS derivation of the inequality −1 ≥ 0 of rank at
most h2, thus proving the following:
Theorem 3.8. Given an FO contradiction ψ, its standard translation into
propositional CNF over a finite universe of size n Cψ,n has an LS refutation of
constant rank that depends on the formula ψ but does not depend on n.
3.2. Infinite model implies non-constant Sherali-Adams rank. We
shall prove that if an FO sentence ψ has an infinite model, the rank of the
SA refutation of its propositional translation Cψ,n grows with n. As an SA
refutation is simply an inconsistent linear program, we shall show that for every
fixed k there is a big enough n0 = n (k) such that for every n ≥ n0 the rank k SA
linear program for Cψ,n is consistent. This can be done by establishing a specific
valuation of the variables of the SA system via a counting (or probabilistic)
argument over all finite segments of any class of infinite models of ψ (or more
precisely, Cψ,ω). If we consider the class of all countable models of Cψ,ω, the
lower bound on the SA rank k as a function of the size of the model n is
polynomial, i.e. Ω (nε) for some constant ε, 0 < α ≤ 1 , that depends only on
the FO sentence ψ.
We start by recalling the structure of the rank k SA system (linear program)
for an FO sentence ψ, which we denote by Lψ,k,n. It is built upon real variables
of the form
pV
j∈C lj
where the index
∧
j∈C lj is a conjunction of no more than k+1 literals lj, each
of which is made up either of an R-variable or an S-variable. Lψ,k,n consists of
the following equations and inequalities:
(3.9) p∅ = 1,
which takes care of the empty conjunct >;
(3.10) pV
j∈C lj∧l + p
V
j∈C lj∧¬l = p
V
j∈C lj
for every |C| ≤ k and every literal l whose variable is different from each of the
variables of lj;
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(3.11) 1 ≥ pV
j∈C lj ≥ 0
for every |C| ≤ k + 1;
(3.12)
∑
i∈D
pV
j∈C lj∧li ≥ pVj∈C lj
for every |C| ≤ k and every small clause ∨i∈D li in Cψ,n, and
(3.13)
∑
x∈[n]
pV
j∈C lj∧Si(c¯,x) ≥ pVj∈C lj
for every |C| ≤ k, every Skolem relation Si in Cψ,n, and every tuple c¯.
Note that the equations (3.9) and (3.10) as well as the inequalities (3.11)
do not depend on ψ. One should also bear in mind that in the LHSs of the
inequalities (3.12) and (3.13), every term, whose index contains both a literal
and its negation, simply vanishes.
We are now ready to state and prove the general SA rank lower bound
lemma.
Lemma 3.14. For a given FO sentence ψ that has an infinite model, there are
constants α, β such that for every fixed k > β and every n ≥ kα, the linear
program Lψ,k,n is consistent.
Proof. We consider a setM of labelled countable models of Cψ,ω. What this
means is that we label the elements of a countable universe by the positive
integers. Note that if M ∈ M and M′ is obtained from M by taking a
permutation of the positive integers (the labels), the models M and M′ are
distinct as labelled models even though they are isomorphic in the usual model-
theoretic sense (as unlabelled models).
Given a labelled modelM of Cψ,ω and a number d, we call the restriction of
M to [d] (the set of elements labelled by {1, 2, . . . d}) an initial segment of M
of size d, and denote it byMd (note thatMd is not a model of Cψ,d as ψ has no
finite models). In other words, an initial segment of size d is any labelled (by
[d]) finite structure of size d that could be extended into a (countable) labelled
model of Cψ,ω. Call a labelled model M of Cψ,ω amenable if all S-variables
with arguments in [d] have witnesses in [d + e]. Let Md|e be the restriction
of an amenable model M of Cψ,ω to [d + e] such that no S-variable witnesses
are given when not all of their arguments are contained in [d]. Thus a model
Rank complexity gap for LS and SA 15
Md|e, when extended to an amenable model M, may actually have S-variable
witnesses to [d + e] (when not all arguments are in [d]) in [d + e] or elsewhere
– the point is that we will not record them if they are in [d + e]. We will
never care about these witnesses and, since it will be confusing to have them,
we explicitly ignore them. We denote by Md|e, the set of Md|e so derived
from amenable models M of Cψ,ω. In general, if e is not sufficiently large as a
function of d, then Md|e may be empty. Finally, we denote by Md|e
(∧
j∈C lj
)
the class of models in Md|e that are consistent with the conjunction
∧
j∈C lj,
built upon R-variables and S-variables, whose elements are from [d + e] but
whose S-variable arguments are all from [d] (so we allow {d+ 1, . . . , d+ e} to
appear as arguments in R-variables).
Clearly, the set Md|e
(∧
j∈C lj
)
is finite, and Md|e = Md|e (>) is the set of
all labelled finite models of size d + e, whose S-variable arguments in [d] are
witnessed in [d+ e], that could be extended to countable models of Cψ,ω.
We can now define our valuation as follows. Given a fixed rank k, we set
d := (k + 1) · max {p, q}, where p and q are the maximal arities of relation
symbols in ψ and Skolem relations in Cψ,n, respectively, and e := b · dq, where
b is the number of Skolem relations in Cψ,n. Note that e is sufficiently large to
accommodate all potential S-variable witnesses to the set [d], this is important
as it will always force Md|e to be non-empty. Let
∧
j∈C lj contain R-variables
whose arguments are in [d+ e] and S-variables whose arguments are in [d] and
whose witnesses are in [d+ e]. Set the values of our variables as
pV
j∈C lj =
∣∣∣Md|e (∧j∈C lj)∣∣∣∣∣Md|e∣∣
for every |C| ≤ k + 1. If ∧j∈C lj contains R-variables whose arguments are
outside of [d + e] or S-variables whose arguments are outside of [d] or whose
witnesses are outside of [d + e], then we fix the problem by taking a conjunct
that is isomorphic to
∧
j∈C lj and whose R-variable arguments are all within
[d+ e] and whose S-variable arguments are within [d] and whose witnesses are
in [d+e]. Thus any two variables indexed by isomorphic conjunctions will have
the same value.
In other words, we set the values of the variables in a natural way – the
variable pV
j∈C lj is meant to “represent” the conjunction
∧
j∈C lj, and it is a
real variable in the interval [0, 1], so it is natural that it is set to the fraction
of initial segments that are consistent (satisfy)
∧
j∈C lj or, if you prefer, to the
probability that an initial segment picked uniformly at random satisfies the
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conjunction. Note also that if
∧
j∈C lj is inconsistent with Cψ,ω, pVj∈C lj is set to
0. What remains to be verified is that this valuation indeed satisfies the rank-k
SA system for Cψ,n for n ≥ kα for some suitable chosen constant α.
The inequalities (3.9) and (3.11) are trivially fulfilled as are the equations
(3.10) – every initial segment consistent with
∧
j∈C lj has either l = ⊥ or l = >
but not both. As for the small-clause inequalities (3.12) , it is enough to recall
that every initial segment Md|e is a substructure of a model of Cψ,ω and as
such Md|e satisfies every small clause
∨
i∈D li whose R-variable arguments are
in [d + e] and whose S-variable arguments are within [d] and whose witnesses
are in [d+ e], so we have
Md|e
(∧
j∈C
lj
)
=
⋃
i∈D
Md|e
(∧
j∈C
lj ∧ li
)
for all conjuncts
∧
j∈C lj and therefore∑
i∈D
∣∣∣∣∣Md|e
(∧
j∈C
lj ∧ li
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣Md|e
(∧
j∈C
lj
)∣∣∣∣∣ .
The only remaining case which, in fact, gives the lower bound, is the case of
big clauses (3.13). Consider such an inequality of the form
(3.15)
∑
x∈[n]
pV
j∈C lj∧Si(c¯,x) ≥ pVj∈C lj
for some fixed conjunction
∧
j∈C lj, whose R-variable arguments are in [d + e]
and whose S-variable arguments are within [d] and whose witnesses are in
[d+ e]. By the definition of our valuation
pV
j∈C lj∧Si(c¯,1) + . . .+ p
V
j∈C lj∧Si(c¯,d+e) = p
V
j∈C lj ,
because we insist that the witnesses in our initial segments exist. Let z :=
max{p, q, b} and let k ≥ (z+1)zz+1 =: β; the result proceeds in the following
fashion.
n = d+ e := (k + 1)max{p, q}+ bq((k + 1)max{p, q})q
≤ (k + 1)q+3 as k ≥ max{p, q, b}q
≤ kq+4 as k ≥ (z + 1)zz + 1
Finally, set α := q + 4 and the result follows. 
We can finally state the SA rank lower bound theorem for FO sentences, which
is a trivial consequence of Lemma 3.14.
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Theorem 3.16. Given a first-order sentence ψ that fails in the finite but has
an infinite model, there is a constant ε, 0 < ε ≤ 1
4
, such that every Sherali-
Adams refutation of the propositional translation of ψ, Cψ,n, requires a rank at
least Ω (n)ε, where n is the size of a finite model.
4. Conclusion and Open problems
Our result leaves a number of open questions:
1. Can the gap be widened, i.e. can we replace polynomial SA by linear SA?
Our guess is “yes”, and it is supported by concrete examples, such as
the Pigeonhole principle and the Least number principle – see the lower
bounds in Dantchev et al. (2009).
2. Can a gap be proven in a much more general and abstract setting, e.g. for
the proof systems whose lines have “small” communication complexity,
defined in Beame et al. (2010)? These systems include not only LS and
SA but also LS+ and stronger generalisations, such as the Lassere proof
system. This could be rather difficult as the gap would be in a different
place for different systems as the Pigeonhole principle has a rank two LS+
proof.
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